Abstract. The standard technique to attack triple encryption is the meet-in-the-middle attack which requires 2 112 encryption steps. In this paper, more efficient attacks are presented. One of our attacks reduces the overall number of steps to roughly 2 108 . Other attacks optimize the number of encryptions at the cost of increasing the number of other operations. It is possible to break triple DES doing 2 90 single encryptions and no more than 2 113 faster operations.
Introduction
The most well-known symmetric encryption algorithm is the Data Encryption Standard (DES). It defines a block cipher with 64-bit blocks and 56-bit keys. Due to questions raised regarding the small key size, several varieties of multiple encryption have been considered for the DES, including double and triple DES. ?
In this paper, we consider arbitrary single encryption functions E{0, 1} k × {0, 1} s −→ {0, 1} s with k-bit keys and a block size of s bits, and in particular A part of this research was done while the author was at the University of Göttingen.
point out the consequences of our findings for triple DES. Since multiple encryption is mainly of relevance to strengthen block ciphers with a small key space, we concentrate on k ≤ s. With two k-bit keys L and M and two encryption functions E 1 and E 2 , double encryption is defined by C = E Double DES is double encryption with E 1 = E 2 = E. Triple DES is usually defined by E 1 = E 3 = E, E 2 = D, where E denotes the (single) DES encryption function and D its decryption counterpart.
In general, we assume the functions E i and D i to behave like a set of 2 k random permutations E i K with K ∈ {0, 1} k , chosen according to the uniform probability distribution. Usually, nonrandom statistical properties are considered to be weaknesses of block ciphers. In the special case of the DES, two important statistical weaknesses are known, the complementation property, which is exploited in Section 6 of this paper, and a small number of weak keys.
All attacks considered in this paper are key-search attacks and exploit known (or chosen) pairs of plaintext and ciphertext. To measure the complexity of an attack, we consider four values: one neglects possible weaknesses of the underlying encryption functions. Idealizations of the underlying encryption functions are accessible to the attacker by querying encryption/decryption oracles, but the attacker has no knowledge about the oracles' internals. In the sequel, we refer to this point of view as the "black-box-only" model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes previously known attacks, concentrating on the meet-in-the-middle attack. In Section 3, we introduce the notion of "t-collisions" and use it for a technique to reduce the number of steps. In Sections 4 and 5 we consider that single encryptions are much slower than each of the other steps, and we design attacks optimized to save single encryptions (but not the total number of steps). In Section 6 we exploit the complementation property of DES and triple DES to further improve our attacks. Finally, in Section 7 we concentrate on the consequences of our findings for the security of triple DES. 111 . This is the number we use when comparing the MITM attack with our probabilistic attacks.) Advanced MITM techniques for attacking two-key triple encryption have been studied by van Oorschot and Wiener [6] . The same authors also proposed advanced MITM techniques for attacking double encryption [7] .
Previous Work
Kelsey, Schneier, and Wagner [2] demonstrated how to attack three-key triple DES using related-key techniques. Let a plaintext p and a corresponding ciphertext c be known to the attacker. Assume the attacker to be able to change the first subkey from L to L + ∆ (both L and L + ∆ unknown to the her, but ∆ known). If the attacker receives the decryption of c under the modified key, then she can find the subkey L using only 2 k steps (and the same number of single encryptions). The second and third subkeys M and N can be found as in the case of double encryption.
If the same plaintext is encrypted 2 28 times using triple DES under 2 28 different keys, an attacker can recover one of the 2 28 keys using 2 84 steps (and the same number of single encryptions). This result is due to Biham [1] .
DESX is a variant of DES, where encrypting and decrypting requires to compute one single encryption and two XORs of s-bit blocks. Kilian and Rogaway [3] describe the security of DESX in the black-box-only model, concentrating on finding a lower bound for the number of single encryptions every black box attack needs.
How to Save Steps
In this section, we describe an "operation optimized" attack to save some steps of computation, compared to MITM.
Consider a function f : {0, 1} * −→ {0, 1} s . A collision is a pair x, y of inputs with x = y and f (x) = f (y). The value v ∈ {0, 1} s is associated with a t-collision, if there exists a set S with |S| ≥ t inputs and f (x) = v for all 1 When computing the complexity of this stage, the operation of computing a value 
k , hence the number of inputs for the function f pi is w = 2 k . We write K 1 (a, i) for the set of all keys which encrypt the plaintext p i to the ciphertext a using E 1 . Similarly, we write K 3 (b, i) for all keys which decrypt the ciphertext c i to b, using E 3 . I.e.,
s of values associated with t-collisions:
Our attack works like this:
2 be a known pair of plaintext and ciphertext; initialize the sets
The procedure "tripletest" can be realized like this:
repeat: choose j ∈ S I at random; When "tripletest" is called, the equation
holds. In the procedure, we are looking for
If we fail often enough, i.e., 3k−s+δ s times, we accept the key-triple (L, M, N ) as correct. The value δ serves as a security parameter, the risk to accept an incorrect key-triple is no more that 2 −δ . On the average, a wrong key-triple requires insignificantly more than three single encryptions, i.e., one computation of c := . . ., since for j ∈ {1, . . . , l}−{i}, rounds. E.g., two rounds are sufficient for triple DES (k = 56 and s = 64) if δ = 20. In the sequel, we assume δ to be "large enough" and ignore the risk of accepting an incorrect key-triple. Proof. Both stages are to be executed l times. During every iteration of the "Repeat" loop, no results of previous iterations are needed. Hence, the amount of storage for the attack can be estimated by the storage space during one iteration, and the required number of steps is l times the average number of steps during one iteration. Below, we estimate the storage space and the number of steps for one such iteration. 
thus we only need slightly more than 2 109 steps (and as much single encryptions). From a practical point of view, the operation optimized attack is not very useful for breaking triple DES. It is faster than MITM, but requires much more pairs of known plaintexts/ciphertext (e.g., about 2 45 if t = 7, compared to 3 for MITM). But from a theoretical point of view, the attack's performance clearly indicates triple DES to be weaker than widely believed.
How to Save Single Encryptions
The previous section's technique to reduce the number of steps seems to be at a dead end. So in the next two sections, we concentrate on reducing the number of single encryptions instead the number of steps. This section deals with an "encryption optimized" attack. Instead of l sets S A (i) depending on p i , we choose one fixed set S A and no longer exploit the occurances of t-collisions.
Let there be l plaintext/ciphertext pairs (p 1 , c 1 ) , . . . , (p l , c l ) known to the attacker. In the previous section, we computed a set S A (i) ⊆ {0, 1} s for every index i ∈ {1, . . . , l}. Now instead, we choose one set S A = S A (1) = · · · = S A (l). The size |S A | of S A is fixed and |S A | 2 s . We assume the a ∈ S A to be chosen randomly. (We use the independence of the sets S A and {a ∈ {0,
where L denotes the correct first key.) Our attack consists of three stages:
1. For a ∈ S A : compute the sets
For b ∈ {0, 1}
s and i ∈ {1, . . . , l}: compute the sets
What is the chance to find the correct key by using the algorithm? Proof. Let the sets S 1 (·) and K 3 (·, ·) be initialized to be empty. The first two stages can be realized like this:
Each loop is iterated l * 2 k times, hence the overall number of elements in the sets K 3 (·, ·) are l * 2 k , the overall number of elements in the sets S 1 (·) is the same (but we only need the sets S 1 (a) for a ∈ S A ), and the number of steps and single encryptions for the first two stages is Θ(l * 2 k ). Stage 3 requires much less storage than the first two stages. Its outer loop "For M ∈ {0, 1} k and a ∈ S A " is iterated 2 k * |S A | ≈ 2 k+s /l times. On the average, the middle loop "for (i, L) ∈ S 1 (a)" is iterated l * 2 k /2 s times, and the inner loop "for N ∈ K 3 (b, i)" is iterated 2 k−s times. Since 2 k−s < 1, the outer and the middle loop determine the number (2
of steps for stage 3. But for the single encryptions, we count how often the operation "b := E 2 M (a)" is executed in the outer loop (i.e., 2 k * |S A | ≈ 2 k+s /l) and add three times the number the operation "c : times. Unlike the operation optimized attack, in which we decreased the number of steps, this section's encryption optimized attack reduces the number of single encryptions but not the number of steps. This optimization reduces the time of the attack as single encryptions are considerably slower than other operations.
How to Save more Single Encryptions
The encryption optimized attack's efficiency is limited, since tripletest is executed 2 3k−s times, which induces 3 * 2 3k−s single encryptions. As we argued in the sketch of proof of theorem 3, the correct key triple (L, M, N ) is found " if a pair (i, a) exists in {1, . . . , l} × S A with E 1 L (p i ) = a." In this section, we modify the attack; we only execute tripletest if there exist two pairs (i, a), (j, a ) 
This idea leads to the "advanced attack". (More generally, we execute tripletest if r pairs (i 1 , a 1 
In this paper, we concentrate on r ∈ {1, 2}.) On one hand, this forces us to increase the number of known plaintext/ciphertext pairs (p · , c · ) in order to succeed. On the other hand, we need to execute the tripletest much less frequently.
The first two stages are the same as before, for stage 3 we do the following:
Theorem 5.
If |S A | ≈ 2 * 2 s /l, the advanced attack's probability to find the correct key-triple is close to 1/2.
Sketch of proof. Let (L, M
* , N) denote the correct key triple. We consider the iteration of the loop "For M ∈ {0, 1} k :" with M = M * , all other iterations cannot succeed anyway. If |S A | ≈ 2 * 2 s /l, the expected number r of pairs (i 1 , a 1 ), . . . , (i r , a r ) 
If there actually exist two such pairs (i 1 , a 1 ) and (i 2 , a 2 ) in {1, . . . , l} × S A , then the following inclusions hold
In this case, the key pair (L, N ) is found twice within the execution of the algorithm. At first "(L, N ) ∈ S" is wrong and (L, N ) is inserted into the set
is the correct key triple.
Theorem 6. If |S
s+1 /l, the advanced attack requires the following resources:
Proof. The resource requirements for the first two stages of the advanced attack are the same as for the encryption optimized attack.
In the third stage, and for fixed M and a, the loop "for (i, L) ∈ S 1 (a)" is iterated about l * 2 k−s times, the inner loop "for (L, N ) ∈ S" is iterated about 2 k−s times. Hence the size of the set S is roughly |S| ≈ l * 2 2k−2s ≤ l. The sets K 3 (·, ·) require l × 2 k = Θ(l * 2 k ) units of storage and thus dominate the advanced attack's storage requirements.
Similarly to the proof of theorem 4, the number of steps is (2 [3] for the number of single encryptions required to break DESX. For details, see appendix A.
A Special Variant for Triple DES
So far, we pretended the underlying single block cipher to be ideal, i.e., to behave like a random permutation. But DES is not an ideal block cipher. Most important in this context is the complementation property: If x denotes the complement of the bit-string x, then for every plaintext p ∈ {0, 1} s and every key K ∈ {0, 1} k :
How does the complementation property affect the efficiency of our attacks? First, we note there is not much harm for the attacker. The encryption optimized attack succeeds, if the sets {p 1 , . . . , p l } and S A are chosen such that there exists a (i, a) ∈ {1, . . . , l} × S A with E 1 L (p i ) = a, L the correct first subkey, cf. proof of theorem 3. This probability is not at all affected by the complementation property E 1 L (p i ) = a. We may argue similarly for the advanced attack. The success rate of the operation optimized attack depends on the probability that for a plaintext p i the correct first subkey L participates in a t-collision
Second, there are many ways for the attacker to exploit the complementation property for a small improvement of an attack. For the sake of shortness, we concentrate on one example. Recall the attack in section 3. Let S A be chosen such that for all a ∈ {0, 1} s the equivalence a ∈ S A ⇐⇒ a ∈ S A holds. The attack is unchanged, except for stage B:
The analysis in section 3 is not much affected. approximates the overall number of steps and single encryptions. Van Oorschot and Wiener [6, 7] considered attacks with decreased memory requirements at the cost of increased running times. Usually, reducing storage requirements is seen as the main goal of improving an attack like MITM. The approach in sections 4 and 5 is to decrease the running time at the cost of storage. As an anonymous referee criticized, this seems to make our attacks less realistic. The current author's reply is that the basic MITM attacks on double encryption and two-key triple encryption both have balanced time-memory characteristics, i.e., require roughly one step of computation per unit of memory. In this case, trading away storage space at the cost of additional computational steps, as van Oorschot and Wiener did, certainly makes such attacks more realistic. On the other hand, the MITM attack on general (three-key) triple encryption has a highly unbalanced time-memory characteristic: 2 k units of memory and 2 2k steps are needed, i.e., 2 k steps per unit of memory. If k is reasonably large, e.g., k = 56, decreasing the running time at the cost of additional memory requirements actually appears to make such attacks more realistic. (Today though, our attacks are far from being practical, as is the MITM attack. It is quite difficult to reasonably estimate the economically best time-memory characteristic of a future technology for which such attacks are practical.) Even though our attacks are far from being practical today, this paper demonstrates that it is too optimistic to identify the complexity of breaking triple DES and similar block ciphers with the complexity of the MITM attack. Also, this paper alludes that the ability to quickly perform many single DES operations is not crucial for breaking triple DES (though even the required number of single DES operations is too large to be considered feasible today). The number of memory accesses, i.e., table look-ups, appears to be dominating-with great consequences on the difficulty of massively parallel triple DES cracking.
